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Abstract
Driven by technological advances, the recent
trend of the sharing economy has brought up
multiple globally successful companies, a disruption
of business models, and presumably more sustainable
alternatives to traditional resource allocation and
consumption. Instead of depending only on professional
companies, people increasingly share their resources
in peer-to-peer networks. In volunteer computing
systems, for example, device owners share their spare
computational resources with other users. Despite
the success stories in other businesses in the sharing
economy, however, the popularity of such peer-to-peer
computing systems has remained limited.
The
authors focus on the perspective of resource providers
and develop a framework of the effectiveness of
monetary incentives to motivate resource providers
in volunteer computing. Drawing from Relational
Models Theory and Motivation Crowding Theory,
the framework proposes a three-way interaction
between monetary incentives, social relationships, i.e.,
sharing with anonymous users versus with friends,
and the individual predisposition of the user, i.e.,
their moral identity centrality.
Informed by a
preliminary survey, a between subjects experiment
tests the propositions and delivers full support for the
hypothesized contingencies. Monetary incentives can
enhance the intrinsic motivation to share resources
when sharing takes place amongst anonymous users.
However, paying monetary rewards can disrupt
motivation when sharing takes place among friends,
especially when users have a high moral identity
centrality. The authors discuss their result in the light
of their conceptual and practical implications.

1.

Introduction

The sharing economy has become a promising
alternative to traditional consumption behavior [1].
Technological advances and the omnipresence of a fast
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Internet connection have made sharing resources not
only easy but also massively scalable. In examples
like Uber or AirBnB resource providers simply need
to register their resources or services online and within
only a few minutes their offer is visible for millions
of people. It is, thus, safe to say that information
and communications technology is the key enabler
for the sharing economy. Besides accommodations
and rides, computational power is a resource that can
be shared on a global scale in a peer-to-peer (P2P)
fashion. With the growing demand of processing
power on the one side and the increasing number of
computing devices on the other side, computational
resource sharing is the logical consequence. The chance
of exploiting the free computational power was seized
decades ago by projects like Condor [2] or Great
Internet Mersenne Prime Search (GIMPS) [3]. Other
classic examples include the BOINC middleware [4]
which supports numerous scientific projects based on
volunteer computing. Mass participation of motivated
users in the sharing scheme is a crucial requirement
for building a large-scale distributed system. While
computational resource sharing for scientific projects
has already been successful for many years, peer-to-peer
volunteer computing systems have never achieved a
comparable popularity. Thus, in this paper, we shed
light on how resource owners can be incentivized to
share their computational power. More specifically,
we examine the effect on monetary incentives on the
willingness to participate.
The role of monetary incentives for sharing is not
yet well understood. Haas et al. [5] suggest that
different types of social relationships require different
incentives for sharing in P2P computing. However,
they do not provide empirical evidence.
Extant
research has revealed that extrinsic rewards can lead to
both a crowding-in as well as a crowding-out of the
intrinsic motivation to engage in prosocial behaviors
such as sharing. Do monetary incentives increase or
decrease resource providers’ willingness to participate
in peer-to-peer volunteer computing systems? Drawing
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from relational models theory ([6, 7]) and motivation
crowding theory ([8, 9]) we derive a conceptual
framework in which we propose that the effect of
monetary incentives in volunteer computing systems
depends on the relationships between resource providers
and consumers. Both theories play important roles
in the sharing economy as sharing happens among
both strangers and friends and different exchange
mechanisms are applied. The interplay of relationship
types and exchange mechanisms might thereby lead
to crowding out effects.
Further, we argue that
the personal predisposition of the resource provider
(i.e., their moral identity centrality) might have an
impact on the willingness to share resources. To test
our hypotheses we conduct a 2x2x3 between subjects
scenario experiment in which we manipulate whether
respondents receive a monetary reward, whether they
share resources with anonymous users or friends,
and whether the system uses gamification elements.
Results fully support our theorizing.
We find a
three-way interaction between monetary incentive,
type of relationship, and respondents’ moral identity
centrality. Specifically, whereas in case of sharing
with anonymous users, the effect of monetary incentives
on willingness to participate is significantly positive
only for those respondents high on moral identity
centrality, for the case of sharing with friends we find
the opposite. Here, the effect of monetary incentives
is positive for low levels of moral identity centrality
but turns negative for high levels. We do not find
significant effects of the use of gamification elements in
our setting. Our results have implications for academic
theory and for the design of platforms for sharing of
computational resources alike. In terms of conceptual
contributions, our results contribute to the literature
streams on collaborative consumption and production on
P2P platforms in the sharing economy, relational models
theory and market mechanisms in the sharing economy,
motivation crowding theory and the role of intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation in the sharing economy, and moral
identity as a predictor of sharing.

2.

Volunteer Computing

Modern offloading mechanisms, virtualization
techniques, and the rapid growth of the global
networking infrastructure make it possible to seamlessly
transfer workload to remote machines. This concept is
known as task offloading and facilitates computational
resource sharing where workload is exchanged
between geographically distributed computing devices.
Resource providers offer their idle computing capacities
to resource consumers that run computationally

intensive applications.Commercial resource providers
such as Amazon EC2 provide computing resources in
a pay-per-usage fashion. This business model is well
suited for companies that shift their computational
workload from on-premise resources to cloud instances.
As the resource demand of recent applications like
rendering virtual reality, processing video streams,
or running artificial intelligence algorithms exceeds
the capabilities of user-owned devices, computation
offloading becomes important also for non-commercial
users. Thus, private users themselves become resource
consumers. Further, the amount of computational
resources is increasing and the processing power
of end-user devices often remains unused. Device
owners can share their resources and become resource
providers for others in volunteer computing systems,
such as OurGrid [10], SocialCloud [11], Social Cloud
Computing [12], and Cloud@home [13]). These P2P
systems can either have an underlying economic model
or enable sharing resources for free.

3.

Determinants of Sharing
Computational Resources

One of the most discussed topics in social distributed
computing is the question why users would share their
resources with others. In the literature, we have
identified three key factors that have an impact on the
users’ willingness to participate. These factors are
motives, social relationships, and obstacles.

3.1.

Motives

In [14], Ryan and Deci summarize a distinction
between types of motivation, based on their
Self-Determination Theory: The most basic distinction
is between intrinsic motivation, which refers to doing
something because it is inherently interesting or
enjoyable, and extrinsic motivation, which refers
to doing something because it leads to a separable
outcome. [14, p. 55] In the following, we discuss
different types of motivation from the rather intrinsic to
more extrinsic motivations.
Altruism — The concept of altruism is often referred
to as a basic motivation in crowd sourcing scenarios.
Altruism can be considered the most intrinsic type of
motivation. Altruistic users are willing to share their
resources for free. The mere activity of sharing and
the feeling of warm glow are inherently enjoyable or
rewarding. This can for instance be the case for some
scientific projects in which users support the goals of
the project and are intrinsically motivated to move the
idea forward.
Gamification — Starting from 2011, the idea
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of gamification became popular [15], meaning
the embedding of game elements into non-game
contexts to make these experiences enjoyable. In
volunteer computing, gamification can be found when
contribution is rewarded with credits that can be
compared with those of other participants. Even though
these rewards do not have an actual monetary value,
they may increase the motivation to participate and
introduce competition between users.
Reputation — Reputation becomes relevant as a
motivation when achievements are connected to real
persons, e.g., when users of volunteer computing have
the possibility to share their results in social media
networks. In [16], Ariely et al. show that people have
a strong desire to be seen by others as doing good.
Communicating that they have provided computational
resources, e.g., for a scientific project, can be a signal
that individuals can use to build up a reputation for doing
good.
Reciprocity — Sharing can be performed in a
reciprocal way where resource consumers share their
own resources in the future and resource providers
receive some kind of credit that they can later trade
for computation. This protocol can be implemented
in multiple one-to-one relationships where the resource
usage between two users needs to balance out. A more
flexible solution is to introduce a credit system which
allows to trade computation between multiple users.
Virtual Currency — Even though reciprocity can be
one way to solve the free-rider problem, it is limited to
scenarios in which the exact same resource is traded.
This may lead to a situation in which a user who
mainly wants to use computational resources from other
users but cannot provide these resources in the future
will be excluded from the system. In turn, users that
own powerful resources accumulate credits that they
will not need to spend as they are never reliant on
remote computational resources. A virtual currency can
help to solve this problem as it might enable users to
trade computational power for other resources such as
bandwidth or storage.
Monetary — Finally, users in P2P systems can even
use real money in transactions. When users pay for
using remote resources, they do not have the obligation
to share resources themselves. Instead, each resource
has its price which can be either fixed, variable, or can
be negotiated between resource consumer and provider.

3.2.

Relationships to Consumers

A fact that is often neglected in distributed
computing systems is that devices are owned by
private users and that these users might have social

relationships. In the following, we categorize different
relationships and discuss what impact they may have on
the willingness to share resources.
Anonymous — In many distributed computing
systems, resource consumers and providers do not know
each other. Resource consumers have no control over
the decision on which device their task is executed
and, in turn, resource providers cannot decide who runs
which task on their machines.
Project-based — In volunteer computing for
scientific projects, users can decide to which project
they want to contribute. Therefore, the project owners
advertise their undertaking and explain how this project
can be beneficial for the public. Resource providers then
select one or multiple projects.
Social Networks — Friendship relations in social
networks are often based on real-world relationships
[17]. Resource owners might rather be willing to
provide their computational power to their friends and
family than to strangers. Thus, the virtual relationships
of social networks can be leveraged to match resource
consumers and providers. Besides leveraging existing
social networks, there can also be networks that are
designed and implemented for the purpose of resource
sharing. Given that there is a certain level of trust
between friends in social networks and issues such as
the free-rider problem or privacy concerns become less
relevant.
Personal Contact — Tasks can be offloaded in
one-to-one relationships where a provider explicitly
grants another user access to resources. One possible
scenario is sharing between people gathered in one room
or in proximity. This solution borrows from the concept
of opportunistic computing [18]. The level of trust can
be considered very high in these systems.

3.3.

Obstacles

Obstacles are reasons that would discourage users to
participate in volunteer computing systems. We discuss
several of these reasons in the following.
Cost — Users might simply not want to share
resources as the additional workload would require more
energy and thus result in higher costs. Especially
when there is no compensation, sharing resources is
comparable to donating money.
Security — Even though many distributed
computing systems are sandboxed and are not
considered a security threat, many people have
mixed feelings about running unknown code on their
devices.
Lack of Motivation — Users might not see any
reason why participating in distributed computing
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systems could be beneficial for them. They might
never have experienced situations in which they would
have required more computational power and thus do
not expect any benefit from a resource sharing system.
Further, the amount of money that they could earn by
renting out their resources in commercial systems might
not be sufficiently incentivizing.
Effort to Participate — Sharing resources requires at
least some manual setup. Users need to install software
that allows to share resources and register an account.
In volunteer computing, users also have to select one or
more projects they would like to contribute to. When
resources of mobile devices are shared, device owners
might need to charge these devices more often which
leads to additional effort.
Device Slow-Down — As each device has a finite
amount of processing power, sharing resources might
result in a slower execution of user applications. Thus,
users might experience a slow-down of their own
applications due to the execution of other people’s tasks.

4.

Pre-study

In a first step, we decided to conduct a pre-study
amongst potential users to elicit their awareness
of possibilities to share computational resources,
their motives and willingness to participate in such
sharing systems depending on incentives and social
relationships, and potential obstacles that would hinder
them from participating. We recruited our participants
via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The sample comprises
208 US-based respondents. The mean age in the
sample is 37.87 years and 49% of the respondents are
female. The respondents received .20$ as compensation
for participation in the survey that took on average
approximately 6 minutes.
To establish an equal understanding of what sharing
of computational resources means, we included an
explanatory text at the beginning of the questionnaire1 .
First, we asked respondents whether they owned a
smartphone, which computational tasks they typically
performed on their devices, and whether they feel that
limited computational power is a problem for them.
Although respondents on average did not agree
that limited computational resources pose a problem
for them, they agreed that they have experienced
their smartphone battery to drain faster due to a
computational intensive application and have felt that
an application might be faster if their phone had more
computational resources.
Further, to ensure that all respondents understand
that sharing can work in both directions, i.e.,
1 Experimental material will be provided by the authors on demand.
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Figure 1. In general, what would be your motivation
to participate in such a system? (1=I do not agree at
all to 7=I fully agree)

respondents can use other users’ computational
resources but can just as well be providers of
computational resources, we included an explanatory
text.
Next, we asked respondents whether they are aware
of the possibility to share computational resources
and whether they have made past experiences with
sharing. 50% of the respondents reported to be aware
of the possibility to share computational resources with
others and 26.9% of these respondents have made
experiences with sharing of computational resources.
Asked for which kind of experience they have made,
most of these respondents report to have participated
in SETI@home and 80% explained that the experience
with sharing of computational resources has been
a positive one. Moreover, we were interested in
respondents’ future willingness to share computational
resources with others. Specifically, we asked them
about their general willingness to share computational
resources with other users (’Would you be willing to
share your computational resources with others? I
would share my resources with others.’, 1=I do not agree
at all to 7=I fully agree, mean value= 3.91), their
willingness to share depending on social relationships
and incentives, and potential obstacles to sharing.
We further directly asked respondents what their
motivation would be to participate in a system to share
computational resources. Here, results reveal the highest
agreement for ’to earn money’. The more altruistic
motives ’to contribute to scientific projects’, ’to use
resources more efficiently’, and ’to help others’ rank
second, third, and fourth, while ’to get access to more
resources myself’ received the least agreement (compare
Figure 1).
We were also interested to know which obstacles
would hinder respondents from participating in sharing
resources with other users. In a descriptive analysis
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of the data, the strongest agreement can be found for
security issues, data privacy, and worries that the own
device could slow down (compare Figure 2).
In terms of social relationships, we were interested
to know whether respondents feel that varying
compensation mechanisms would be appropriate for
different groups of users. To introduce the possibility
of varying compensation mechanisms, we explained
to them: ’Imagine a system that allows you to safely
share your computational resources with others. Now,
imagine a system in which device owners can be
compensated for sharing their resources. They can be
compensated in multiple ways: i) They could share their
resources for free, which means that they do not receive
a compensation. ii) They could receive a compensation
to cover their energy costs. iii) They could receive a
compensation to make a profit. Which compensation
would you demand from the following users for sharing
your resources?’
With friends and family, 67.8% of respondents
would share computational resources for free.
Interestingly, in case of scientific projects, for-profit
organizations, and anonymous private users, the
majority of respondents (43.7%, 58.3%, and 41.1%)
would want the exchange to be profitable for them. In
case of non-profit organizations, the majority (39.8%)
would just expect their costs to be covered. Further, in
case of scientific projects and non-profit organizations,
a considerable share of respondents would be willing
to share their computational resources for free (10.7%
and 14.1%) whereas this is not the case for for-profit
organizations and anonymous private users (compare
Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Which compensation would you demand
from the following users for sharing your resources?
For each of the four user groups participants could
decide whether they would share their resources for
any kind of compensation or whether they would not
share their at all.

5.

Empirical Study

The pre-study revealed some interesting insights
which informed our following work in which we focus
on P2P systems. Interestingly, monetary incentives
seem to play an important role, given that respondents
rate earning money as the most important motivation
to engage in resource sharing. However, the type of
social relationships can obviously not be neglected as it
seems to determine the compensation that users expect
from their peers. In the following, we will derive a
framework of the effectiveness of monetary incentives
in P2P volunteer computing networks and test it in a
between subjects experiment.

5.1.

Hypotheses development

Extrinsic incentives have been found to be effective
to enhance prosocial behaviors such as resource sharing
[19, 16].
However, there is a considerably large literature
stream which has revealed that extrinsic incentives may
lead to both, a crowding-in or a crowding-out of the
intrinsic motivation to engage in prosocial behaviors
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[8, 9]. In other words, monetary rewards can strengthen
or harm the intrinsic motivation to do good deeds.
We propose that the question whether monetary
incentives enhance or reduce the willingness to
participate in volunteer computing depends on the
type of relationship between resource providers and
consumers. We draw from Relational Models Theory
[6, 7] to make this argument. Heyman and Ariely
(2004) explain that humans categorize interactions as
either social or monetary and that their reactions to
monetary incentives depend on this categorization. If
the relationship is categorized as social, providing
a monetary incentive may harm accepted norms of
behavior. To illustrate, imagine the following situation:
If your best friend asks you to help her with her house
move, you would most probably not consider to charge
her an hourly fee.
In line with this literature, we expect monetary
incentives to increase the willingness to participate in
volunteer computing if the consumer group is made up
of anonymous users. This is due to the fact that the
exchange will be categorized as a monetary transaction
and monetary incentives will be considered appropriate.
On the contrary, we expect monetary incentives to
reduce the willingness to participate in volunteer
computing if sharing takes place amongst friends. In
this case, the exchange resembles a social interaction
and receiving a monetary reward would harm social
norms of friendship (e.g., you should not financially
benefit from your friends). Thus, in summary, we
expect monetary rewards to lead to a crowding-in of the
motivation to participate for anonymous private users
and to a crowding-out for sharing amongst friends.
Finally, over and above the interaction between
compensation and relationship type, we argue that these
effects depend on the personal predisposition of the
individual user. Specifically, we expect the users’
centrality of moral identity [20] to be a decisive factor.
The centrality of moral identity is conceptualized as ”the
cognitive schema a person holds about his or her moral
character” [p.124][21]. It is stored in a person’s memory
as a complex knowledge structure consisting of moral
values, goals, traits, and behavioral scripts ([20, 22]).
These knowledge structures are assumed to be acquired
through life experiences and therefore to differ across
individuals [23]. For people whose moral identity
occupies greater centrality within the self-concept,
being a moral person is more self-definitional compared
to other identities [24].
We expect that individual differences in the
centrality of a person’s moral identity will play a
key role in determining their reactions to monetary
incentives in the context of volunteer computing.

Individuals with a high centrality of moral identity
will strive for consistency with their ideal of being a
moral person. This means that they will try to adhere
to accepted social norms of behavior, as, e.g., that
you should not financially benefit from your friends.
For these individuals, a monetary incentive for sharing
resources with friends will likely lead to a reduction in
the willingness to participate (i.e., crowding-out). In a
monetary interaction, however, the monetary incentive
will strengthen these users’ intention to participate
(i.e., crowding-in). Individuals with a low centrality
of moral identity on the other hand, will put less
value on following such rules of social interactions.
For these individuals, a monetary incentive will most
probably have a positive effect and strengthen their
willingness to participate independent of the type of
relationship. To summarize, we expect that in case of
anonymous private users, monetary incentives will lead
to a higher motivation to share for participants with a
high moral identity than for those with a low moral
identity. Conversely, we argue that that amongst friends,
monetary incentives will lead to a lower motivation to
share for participants with a high moral identity than
for those with a low moral identity. We formally
hypothesize:
H1: monetary incentives enhance the willingness to
participate in volunteer computing.
H2: the type of relationship (i.e., anonymous
users versus friends) moderates the effect of monetary
incentives in a way that monetary incentives have
a positive/negative effect on the willingness to share
computational resources with anonymous users/friends.
H3: we propose a three way interaction between
monetary incentive, type of relationship, and moral
identity. More specifically, we hypothesize that in
case of anonymous users/friends, monetary incentives
will lead to a higher/lower motivation to share for
participants with a high moral identity than for those
with a low moral identity.

5.2.

Scenario Experiment

We decided to test our framework in an online
scenario experiment which we will report next. In
this study, we asked participants to imagine a system
in which they could share computational resources
with other users. We experimentally manipulated
whether they would receive a monetary reward or not
and whether they would share their resources with
anonymous private users or with their friends. We
measured individual differences in centrality of moral
identity using an established psychometric scale. We
also included the questions from the preliminary study
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Figure 4. Design of the 2x2x3 between subjects experiment.

to replicate the findings from the descriptive analysis
with a larger sample (results are consistent but we do
not report them for the sake of conciseness). Further,
we decided to manipulate elements of gamification as
this is a highly relevant question for the designers of
such systems. Making the own and the contributions of
other users transparent may enhance users’ motivation
and engagement due to gamification [15].
Design: We thus conducted a 2x2x3 between
subjects scenario experiment (i.e., no monetary
compensation
versus
monetary
compensation;
sharing with anonymous users versus with friends;
no gamification; statistics; leaderboard).
Procedure: We conducted the study as an online
survey, programmed as a series of webpages. The
invitation to participate in the study was sent out via
Amazon’s MTurk. Participants first read the scenario
texts and then rated a set of Likert-type items (all
ranging from 1 to 7). We measured participants’
willingness to participate in such a system, manipulation
checks, the questions from the pre-study, and moral
identity (in this order). Finally, we elicited demographic
information.
Treatment materials: We used the following
treatment materials. All groups received an introduction
which read as follows: ’Imagine a system that allows
you to safely share computational resources.’ As
a manipulation for relationship type we added: ’Via
this software package you can share computational
resources with 1) friends; 2) anonymous users.’ To
manipulate the compensation we further explained:
’The sharing of resources is based on a system of 1)
monetary compensation, i.e., you receive money for the
computational resources which you share with other
users in the system and you pay for the resources
that you use or 2) reciprocity, i.e., you provide your
computational resources to the other users in the system
and may use their resources for free.’ Last, as a
manipulation gamification elements, we included three
levels. In the ’no gamification’ we added no further

information. In the ’statistics’ condition we explained:
’The software is further designed to transparently track
your provision of resources. On a statistics page you
can continuously track the amount of resources that you
provided to other users and the amount of resources
of others that you have used.’ In the ’leaderboard’
condition the text read as follows: ’The software is
further designed as a game in which you compete with
other users for the highest score. You can increase
your score by providing resources to others. On a
leaderboard you can see your performance compared
to those of other users. Each day the best-performing
contributor receives a symbolic award and earns extra
points for the leaderboard.’
Measurement: To capture participants’ willingness
to participate, we included one straightforward item:
’How likely would you be to participate in the system?’
with scale anchors ranging from ’1=not likely at all’ to
’7=very likely’. To measure respondents’ centrality of
moral identity, we used four items from an established
scale developed and tested by Aquino and Reed
(2002). Participants are first provided with the following
instructions: ’Listed below are some characteristics that
might describe a person: Caring, compassionate, fair,
friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, kind.
The person with these characteristics could be you or it
could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in your
mind the kind of person who has these characteristics.
Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act.
When you have a clear image of what this person would
be like, please report in how far you would agree with
the following statements.’ Then, they are asked to
rate their agreement with the following items: 1. ’It
would make me feel good to be a person who has these
characteristics.’ 2. ’Being a person who has these
characteristics is an important part of who I am.’ 3.
’I am actively involved in activities that communicate to
others that I have these characteristics.’ 4. ’I strongly
desire to have these characteristics.’ The items were all
rated on a seven point Likert scale ranging from 1 (’I do
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not agree at all’) to 7 (’I fully agree’). The scale has a
good internal consistency with a Cronbach’s alpha value
of .862 and all factor loading are above .649.
Sample: 498 US participants took part. During the
testing of the questionnaire, the length of the survey
was estimated to be approx. 15 minutes. In the
MTurk sample, on average, it took participants only 10
minutes to answer the full questionnaire. We excluded
those participants who answered the questionnaire in
less than 8 minutes (183 individuals) because it is
unlikely that they answered the questions attentively.
As a consequence, we have a final sample of 315 valid
responses. The mean age is 36.78 years and 47.9%
of the respondents are female. The following table
summarizes the exact sample sizes in all cells:
Manipulation checks: We included manipulation
check items to make sure that our manipulations worked
as intended. To test whether the manipulation of the
social relationship (anonymous users versus friends)
was effective, we included the following two items: 1)
’In the software package, I could share computational
resources with various friends’ and 2) ’In the software
package, I could share computational resources with
various anonymous users’ with the scale anchors ’1=I
do not agree at all’ and ’7=I fully agree’. We used
ANOVA to test for differences across groups. Using
a dummy-coded variable (0 for anonymous users and
1 for friends) as an independent and the first item as
a dependent variable we find a significant difference
(manonymoususers = 4.66; mf riends = 5.25; F (1, 315)
= 7.837, p=.005). The same applies for the second
item (manonymoususers = 4.80; mf riends = 3.54;
F (1, 315) = 29.174, p=.000). To check whether
respondents understood the monetary compensation
manipulation, we included the following two items:
1) ’The sharing of resources in the software package
is based on a system of monetary compensation, i.e.,
you receive money for the computational resources
you share with the other users in the system and
you pay for the resources that you use’ and ’The
sharing of resources in the software package is based
on a system of reciprocity, i.e., you provide your
computational resources to the other users in the system
and you can use their resources for free’ with the scale
anchors ’1=I do not agree at all’ and ’7=I fully agree’.
Using a dummy-coded variable (0 for no monetary
compensation and 1 for monetary compensation) as an
independent and the first manipulation check item as
a dependent variable we find a significant difference
(mnocompensation = 3.35; mmonetarycompensation =
5.40; F (1, 315) = 89.549, p = .000). This is also
the case for the second item (mnocompensation =
4.95; mmonetarycompensation = 3.13; F (1, 315) =

62.243, p = .000). As a test of the third manipulation,
i.e., elements of gamification, we included the following
two items: 1) ’The software package is designed as
a game in which you compete with other users for
the highest score. You can increase your score by
providing resources to others. On a leaderboard
you can see your performance compared to those of
other users. Each day the best-performing contributor
receives a symbolic award and earns extra points
for the leaderboard’ (mnogamif ication = 2.93;
mstatistics = 3.03; mleaderboard = 5.45; F (2, 315) =
55.091, p = .000); 2) ’The software package is designed
to transparently track your provision of resources.
On a statistics page you can continuously track the
amount of resources that you provided to other users
and the amount of resources of others that you have
used’ (mnogamif ication = 4.70; mstatistics = 4.81;
mleaderboard = 3.48; F (2, 315) = 15.120, p =
.000). Thus, the manipulation checks indicate that all
manipulations worked as intended.
Analysis: To analyze our data, we first used ANOVA
to check whether our treatments had significant effects
on the central dependent variable, i.e., the willingness to
participate in volunteer computing. In a second step, we
computed moderated regression analyses using SPSS
Process, model 3, to test for the hypothesized three-way
interaction.
ANOVA results: In a first step, we ran ANOVAs
to test for the effect of the treatments on willingness
to participate. Supporting H1 , the monetary incentive
significantly enhances willingness to participate (F
(1, 315) = 7.844, p = .005). Further, in line with
H2 , we find a significant two-way interaction between
monetary incentive and type of relationship (F (1, 315)
= 3.985, p=.045). Including a binary variable for
moral identity centrality (MIC) (0= low MIC, 1= high
MIC, based on a median split, median =5.5), we find
a significant three way interaction between monetary
incentive, type of relationship, and MIC (F (1, 315) =
5.950, p = .015), providing first evidence for H3 .
Figure 5 presents the means these groups.
Concerning the manipulation of gamification
elements, we neither find direct nor interactive effects
with the other treatments. Thus, we merely control for
the manipulation in the analyses.
Moderated Regression Results: To formally test
for the moderating role of moral identity centrality, we
implemented a moderated regression analysis in SPSS
process, model 3, with Y=willingness to participate,
X=monetary incentive, W=relationship type friends,
and Z=MIC. The results of the model estimation fully
support our theorizing. The two-way interaction (b =
4.35, p = .022) as well as the three way interaction
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Figure 5. Willingness to participate in volunteer computing across groups.

The contingent effect of monetary incentives on the
Coefficients of the effect of monetary incentive
willingness to participate in volunteer computing

6.
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Figure 6. Simple slopes: the effect of monetary
incentives on willingness to participate for different
social relationships and varying levels of moral identity
centrality.

(b = −.93, p = .005) are significant. Further, simple
slopes analyses reveal interesting insight about the effect
of the independent variable monetary incentive on the
dependent variable of willingness to participate for
different levels of the moderators.
Figure 6 graphically illustrates these results. In
case of anonymous users, the effect of monetary
incentives is insignificant for lower levels of MIC
and significantly positive for mean and higher levels.
For the case of sharing with friends, in contrast, the
effect of monetary incentives is significantly positive
for lower levels of MIC, insignificant for mean levels,
and significantly negative for higher levels. Whereas
the coefficients of the effect of monetary incentives
on willingness to participate for anonymous private
users are not significantly different from each other,
the coefficients for friends do differ significantly
indicated by confidence intervals which do not overlap
(blowM IC = 1.07, [.3102; 1.8235]; bhighM IC =
.086, [1.6906; −.0282].

Our results have implications for academic theory
and for the design of platforms for sharing of
computational resources alike. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper is the first which combines
the two theories of relational models and motivation
crowding to explain sharing behavior. While P2P
computing is only one application area among multiple
examples, further research is necessary to validate these
results in other parts of the sharing economy where
sharing happens among strangers and friends. In terms
of conceptual contributions, our results contribute to
four literature streams. First, we contribute to the
literature on P2P platforms in the sharing economy.
The results of our scenario experiment indicate that
monetary incentives may have detrimental effects on
participation of the type of relationship between users
is a social relationship and thereby tie in very well with
recent findings on social versus market-based exchanges
in the sharing economy. Second, our study links to
the evolving stream of research on relational models in
general by providing another application in which these
models play a decisive role [25]. Third, only very few
papers have so far scrutinized the factors that moderate
the effect of extrinsic incentives on prosocial behaviors.
While conceptual work has laid out the mechanisms
by which crowding-in and crowding-out effects occur,
only very little empirical research has so far identified
and empirically tested moderating variables that explain
this “flip” (e.g., [26]). Fourth, by testing moral identity
centrality as a moderator in our model, we contribute to
the incipient research stream that proposes this construct
to be an important determinant of prosocial behaviors
[21]. In terms of practical implications, our results
suggest that software developers attempting to design
tools for the sharing of computational resources should
take into account that monetary incentives can enhance
or harm willingness to participate depending on social
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relationships and personal characteristics. As every
study, this study has limitations which at the same
time represent avenues for future research. First, our
scenario experiment relies on an intentional measure as
dependent variable. It is widely known that intentions
and behaviors may differ and it would be a necessary
next step to replicate this study’s results in a setting that
includes objectively measured outcomes. This could be
done in a field-experiment with a real application of
P2P resource sharing. This would also allow for the
analysis of more diverse behavioral dependent variables.
We expect gamification to show an effect when applied
in a field study. As gamification leverages peoples’
emotions and desires it can hardly be simulated in
scenario experiments but reveals its full potential only
in real world settings. Second, we only test for the
effect of monetary rewards versus no monetary rewards
while the spectrum of possible incentives is much
broader. A follow-up study could test various incentives
ranging from more intrinsic to more extrinsic rewards
and observe the respective motivation crowding-effects.
Finally, while we chose to focus on moral identity
centrality, there could be other important personality
factors that we neglected. Future research could set out
to test other possible individual-level factors that capture
unexplained variance.
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